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Abstract:  
Since the 1990s, Burkina Faso has intensified the implementation of supporting policies to 
enhance the access to capital and liquidity in the informal economy. This paper analyzes the 
effects of these policies on incomes, employment and economic growth by taking into 
account the interactions between the informal sector, the formal sector and the agricultural 
sector. For that purpose, policy shocks are simulated through the Partnership for Economic 
Policy Network’s static computable general equilibrium model which is adapted to the 
structure of a 2008-based social accounting matrix developed by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute. Our results highlight mixed effects including a paradoxical contraction of 
the informal sector, the formal sector and economic growth as well as an improvement of the 
informal households and the farmers’ incomes. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to shed light on the effects on incomes, employment and growth of public 
policies overcoming capital and liquidity constraints faced by the informal economy in 
Burkina Faso. Specifically it evaluates the direct effects of these public policies on the 
informal economy outcomes, and the indirect effects on the formal sector, the agricultural 
sector as well as the economic growth. Policy interventions are simulated using the PEP 
standard single-country and static Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model adapted to 
the structure of the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM-2008) developed by the IFPRI for 
Burkina Faso. The results provide evidence that enhancing the informal sector’s access to 
capital and mitigating liquidity constraints through public transfers for informal households 
lead mainly to negative spillovers on the informal and formal sectors, on the salaried workers’ 
incomes as well as the GDP. 
The informal economy
1
 in Africa has been considered for a long time as a range of marginal 
activities doomed to disappear with an improving economic development (Schneider and 
Enste, 2000). But during this last decade, the informal economy placed itself as a potential 
source of incomes by providing after the agricultural sector the most number of jobs. In fact, 
according to the International Labour Organization (ILO) the informal economy represents 
42% of the GDP and occupies about 70% of the non-farming workforce of Sub-Saharan 
countries
2
. In Burkina Faso, the informal economy employs 74% of the non-farming 
workforce and contributes to about 25% of the GDP (National Office of Statistics of Burkina).  
However, the main actors of the informal economy are paradoxically among the most 
precarious and vulnerable. In fact, most of the informal actors are deprived from social 
protection, faced with weak skills and credit constraints which undermine their productivity 
(Traoré, 2013; Benjamin and Mbaye, 2012). Furthermore, relatively low levels of women’s 
education and social norms often limit women to unpaid domestic cleaning work and small 
income-generating activities at home or on streets from which they derive the most precarious 
incomes (Traoré, 2013; Kuepie, Nordman and Roubaud, 2009; Chen, 2001). So the informal 
economy is a concern for Governments of Africa interested in alleviating poverty and 
inequities.  
Despite its magnitude the informal economy contributes very weakly to the domestic direct 
tax revenues. According to a recent study carried out in the Francophone West African 
countries, the informal activities provide only 3% of the national direct tax effort (Benjamin 
and Mbaye, 2012). Therefore, promoting informal activities to raise their productivity by 
                                                          
1
 The definition of the informal economy has been the subject of several debates (ILO, 1972; Hart, 1973; Weeks, 1975; Sethuraman, 1981; 
Tokman, 1987; Lautier, 1994; International Labour Conference consensus, 2002). But nowadays there is a kind of consensus on its 
definition.  The informal economy encompasses two dimensions: the enterprise-based dimension and the employment-based dimension. 
The enterprise-based dimension refers to all the non-farming firms which don’t comply with the administrative and fiscal rules required by 
the legislation (registration, written accounting …). This dimension is captured by the term “informal sector”. The employment-based 
dimension refers to all (non-farming) jobs deprived from social protection, work contract and social dialogue. This dimension is captured by 
the term “informal employment”. Through the both dimensions, there is the notion of “continuum” opposed to the dichotomy notion. In 
fact, some firms and jobs comply with some of the rules but escape to the others. So there are different degrees of informali ty towards 
formality which required the compliance with all the legislative rules 
2 International Labour Organization (ILO) : 12th African Regional Meeting on Empowering Africa’s peoples with decent work ; 
Johannesburg, South Africa, October 11-14 2011 
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facilitating their formalization represent an opportunity for Governments to broaden tax base 
necessary to mobilize more domestic resources for development outcomes. 
Another relevant issue related to the informal economy is found in its tendency to threaten the 
structural transformation of African countries. According to the ERA
3
 (2014) : “In Africa, 
resources have often moved from higher to lower productivity sectors, particularly to the 
informal sector, reversing structural transformation and slowing productivity growth”. The 
ERA
4
 (2015) highlighted the large involment of the informal sector in trade and services - 
identified as engines of structural transformation- and stressed the need of appropriate policies to 
harness the potential of the informal sector in Africa by expanding social protection systems, 
fiscal and credit incentives, skill development programmes, technology transfer and infrastructure 
investment. 
 
In line with these recommendations, many African countries (Senegal, Ghana, Ivory Coast, 
Burkina Faso, etc.) are implementing a range of policies to enhance the productivity of the 
informal economy. In Burkina Faso, the Government established public structures since 1998 
to support the informal firms at technical and financial levels. These structures provide 
vocational trainings to improve managerial abilities and credit at low rates along with cash 
transfers, in order to mitigate capital and liquidity constraints.  
However, some studies provided evidence that subsidized credit or vocational trainings to 
promote the informal sector productivity could be inefficient or harmful for the informal 
sector itself, for the formal sector, the agricultural sector as well as the economic growth 
subject to some conditions (Arvin-Rad, Basu and Willumsen, 2010; Alia et al, 2009; Banerji 
and Sanjay, 2007; Roy, 2006). These conditions pertain mainly to the linkages between the 
informal and formal economies, such as competition or cooperation, imperfect substitution 
between the informal-based products and formal-based products and the saturation of market.  
So it is important to know in the context of Burkina Faso: what is the impact of the policies 
enhancing the access to capital and liquidity for the informal economy on itself, on the formal 
sector and the agricultural sector? Did these policies induce positive spillovers on incomes, 
jobs and economic growth? In Burkina Faso, most of studies have addressed the determinants 
and structure of the informal economy, its linkages with the formal economy and the barriers 
to formalization (Traoré, 2013; Grimm et al, 2012; Ouédraogo et al, 2011; Böhme and Thiele, 
2011; Grimm and Günther, 2005; Zerbo, 2001; Ouédraogo, 1996). However research to 
evaluate the effects of policies supporting the informal economy is almost non-existent.  Thus 
the added value of this research is to fill this gap in order to enlighten the policy makers. 
Several econometric analyses, for instance, propensity-score matching and randomization 
have been used to evaluate the impact of micro-lending and vocational training programs 
serving the informal enterprises on earnings, employment, and inequalities in the context of 
                                                          
3 ECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa) and AUC (African Union Commission). 2014. “Economic Report on Africa 2014: 
Dynamic Industrial Policy in Africa: Innovative Institutions, Effective Processes and Flexible Mechanisms.”ECA, Addis Ababa.  
4 ECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa) and AUC (African Union Commission). 2015. “Economic Report on Africa 2015: 
Industrializing through Trade.” ECA, Addis Ababa. 
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countries like Madagascar and Cameroon (Nguimkeu, 2014; Mano et al. 2012; Berge et al. 
2011; Glaub et al. 2011; Gubert and Roubaud, 2011). These studies in general found positive 
effects (often limited) of such programs on earnings and employment within the informal 
economy along with a reducing inequality. But the main limit of the microeconomic analyses 
is found in its failure to capture the indirect effects on the formal and agricultural sectors as 
well as on economic growth. Given the strong informal-formal linkages which could reverse 
the benefits of the scaling-up programs, a CGE model is well suited to highlight the 
transmission channels and capture the indirect effects.  
In fact, this approach has been used by recent research addressing the informal economy. For 
instance, Erero et al (2014) and Erero et al. (2013) used a multi-sectoral computable general 
equilibrium model adapted to the economy of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to 
analyze the effects of reducing tariffs and wage subsidies for lower-skilled formal workers. 
Davies et al. (2011) also used a CGE model included the economy wide linkages between the 
formal and informal economies, to address the effects of trade liberalization in South Africa. 
However, recent studies using a CGE model to analyze the effects of a policy shock on the 
informal economy are scarce, especially in the African context. Indeed, one of the most recent 
one is the study by Alia, Ndjana, and Nghogue (2009) which assessed the impact of the 
increase in the informal households’ investment under the program “Integrated Support 
Program for Actors of the Informal Sector” in Cameroon.  However, in their model the value 
added of the sectors (formal and informal) are combinations of capital and labor according to 
a Cobb Douglas function which constrained the value of the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labor to 1. The capital is sectoral specific and only one category of labor is 
considered so ignoring the quality aspect of labor. 
 
Our model is more flexible and realistic because all the sectors (informal, formal and 
agricultural) combine unskilled labor, skilled labor and capital through a CES production 
technology. Moreover, the households are assumed to have a Stone-Geary utility function 
which includes a minimum level of consumption for each commodity and avoid zero cross-
price elasticities between all pairs of goods, and a unit income-elasticity for all goods. Policy 
experiments deal with a 10% in the demand for productive capital in the informal sector and a 
10% increase in the Government’s transfers to the informal households. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a relevant literature 
review. Section 3 addresses the main points of the CGE model whereas the following section 
presents the SAM-2008 used in our empirical analysis. Section 5 summarizes the motivations 
of the policy experiments and Section 6 presents the results along with the related discussion. 
The last section concludes with policy recommendations. 
2. Literature Review 
Inspired by the Harris-Todaro model (1970), many authors have incorporated the duality in 
the analysis of the urban labor market considering the informal sector as the lower urban 
segment able to absorb all or almost the surplus of labor at competitive low wage rates 
(Fields, 1975; Chandra et Khan, 1993; Gupta, 1993; Marjit, 2003; Marjit et al, 2007; 
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Bhattacharya, 2011). Given its importance in the economies of developing countries, the 
informal sector occupied early a prominent place in development policies. Since 1975, 
authors such as Weeks (1975) advocated subsidy policies of capital and prices to boost this 
sector. Follow-up these recommendations, other researchers (Ghosh and Sarkar, 1989; 
Chaudhuri, 1989; Gupta, 1993; Chaudhuri, 2000) studied the effects on employment and 
incomes of different subsidy policies to the benefit of informal sector.  
These studies can be classified in two major groups according to the assumed informal-formal 
relationship. The first class of studies assumed that the informal sector produces only 
intermediate goods for the formal sector. In other words, the formal sector sub-contracts 
intermediate stages of production to the informal sector. The second class of papers allowed 
competition between formal and informal sectors. For instance, the informal sector uses 
output of the formal sector as intermediate input to produce also finished goods consumed by 
the households. 
Informal sector as a producer of intermediate goods for the formal sector 
Based on the sub-contracting informal-formal linkages, Sarkar and Ghosh (1989), Chaudhuri 
(1989) provided evidence that subsidizing the interest rates for the informal firms to easier 
access to credit tends to reduce production and employment in the formal industrial sector  
while it expands the informal sector. But in their models the urban informal sector is supposed 
to be able to absorb all the labor coming from the rural areas. Contrariwise, Gupta (1993) 
included in its analysis the existence of an urban unemployment even in the presence of the 
informal sector and found nuanced results. He concluded that an increase of capital subsidy 
for informal firms leads to a growth of the wage rate and a decrease in output prices within 
this sector by reducing employment (so rising unemployment) in the urban area consisting of 
formal and informal sectors.  
Contrary, a price subsidy for the informal firms output tends to reduce the wage rate but to 
enhance the output price within this sector by rising employment in the urban sector. In order 
to compare these two types of policy Gupta (1993) used the definition of social welfare by 
Sen (1974), to show that an output price subsidy granted to the informal sector rises the social 
welfare while a capital subsidy policy shrinks it. Gupta (1993) went further in his analysis by 
exploring the effects of subsidy policies in favor of the formal sector and the rural
5
 sector. 
Then he demonstrated that subsidizing wages paid by the formal firms tend to lower the 
output price and the wage rate in the informal sector, but to increase employment in the urban 
area. As for the rural sector, prices or wages subsidies implies an increase in the price of 
output and the wage rate in the informal sector but a fall in employment in the urban area. 
Nevertheless, Chaudhuri (2000) highlighted the main limit of the model used by Gupta 
(1993). Indeed this model ignored the role of the aggregate demand in determining the level 
of production and employment in the manufacturing and rural sectors. Thus, by including the 
principle of demand, Chaudhuri (2000) confirmed the findings of Gupta (1993) relative to the 
effects of capital subsidy granted to informal firms on the informal sector itself: increase in 
                                                          
5
 The rural sector represents agricultural activities in the rural area  
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wage rate and decrease in output price. But he found that this policy also implied a growth of 
production and employment in the urban formal sector and the rural sector which is contrary 
to Gupta (1993) conclusions. 
Furthermore, according to Chaudhuri (2000), a price or wage subsidy in favor of the rural 
sector raises the aggregate income of rural workers which tends to stimulate demand for 
products in all sectors. Stimulated demand results in a growth of production and employment 
throughout all the sectors (rural, informal and formal). By the same aggregate demand 
mechanism, policy promoting formal manufacturing sector induces positive spillovers on all 
the economy. 
Rather than analyzing the effects of policies that change the relative costs of production 
(capital, price and wage subsidies) of informal firms, other authors have studied the effects of 
policies that affect their productivity. For instance, according to Arvin-Rad, Basu and 
Willumsen (2010) a positive technological shock on the informal sector represents any policy 
such as vocational and entrepreneurship trainings, or access to capital or a new production 
technology leading to the improvement of workers’ productivity in this sector. In their general 
equilibrium model based on four sectors - the rural, the urban informal, the urban domestic 
formal and the foreign capital-owned sectors -, the increase in informal firms’ productivity is 
captured by reducing the input–output coefficients in the informal sector. 
Thus they demonstrated a positive technological shock on informal sector tends to raise 
incomes without altering the output price and the return to domestic capital within this sector. 
Other interesting findings depend on the relative factor intensities of the two urban formal 
sectors (domestic and capital-owned multinational) relative to the rural sector. Assuming that 
those sectors are both relatively more capital intensive in the informal employment adjusted 
gross sense than the rural sector, then the enhancement of informal workers’ productivity 
results in a contraction of the output of the informal sector and the domestic formal sector but 
an increase in the rural sector output if and only if the elasticity of substitution between labor 
and capital in the informal sector is greater than unity. The output of the foreign capital-
owned sector remains constant.  
Subject to the same conditions, employment shrinks in the informal and the domestic formal 
sectors while it rises in the rural sector. Employment remains unchanged in the foreign 
capital-owned sector. Besides, the authors provided evidence that a credit subsidy to the 
informal sector results in the similar effects on production and employment. So they pointed 
out the conditions under which technological improvement in the informal sector can be 
damaging to the informal sector itself and the other sectors of the economy. However some 
surveys and stylized facts confirmed that in Africa consumers faced with finished goods 
produced by the formal and informal sectors (1-2-3 Surveys, 2000; Benjamin and Mbaye, 
2012). The informal sector also uses part of the formal sector output as intermediate input and 
the two sectors are usually in competition. 
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Competition between the informal sector and the formal sector 
Therefore, taking into account the possibility of competition between formal and informal 
sectors, Roy (2006) demonstrated that subsidies granted to the informal sector would be 
ineffective in growing the incomes within that sector subject to certain conditions such as 
imperfect substitution between informal products and formal goods and the market saturation. 
Indeed assuming imperfect substitution between the informal-based goods and the formal-
based goods, Kelley (1994) provided evidence that strategies designed to promote the 
informal sector lead to a reduction of the aggregate output and the incomes of informal 
producers in the context of Peru. 
Sanjay and Banerji (2007) use also an analytical framework based on competition between 
formal and informal but in which the informal sector is supposed to produce quality goods 
less than those in the formal sector. The formal sector has a low cost of capital but facing the 
high cost of labor due to the minimum wage. In contrast, informal firms face the high cost of 
capital due to credit rationing, but has the low cost of labor due to wage flexibility. 
In other words, the formal sector has a comparative advantage in the production of high 
quality goods intensive in capital while the informal sector has the advantage in the 
production of low quality goods and intensive in labor. Within this framework, Sanjay and 
Banerji (2007) proved that financial support policies as microfinance to reduce the interest 
rate for the informal firms improve the advantage of those firms in the production of relatively 
low-quality goods. Therefore, the production and the share of the informal sector market 
expand at the expense of the formal sector which shrinks. 
Adopting the same idea, Cogneau, Razindrakoto and Roubaud, (1996) included quality 
dualism in a CGE model applied in the context of Cameroon.  In their model in case of a 
falling income, the consumption of formal goods decreases more than that of the informal 
sector goods. So the income-elasticity of informal products is lower than that of formal 
products. The authors did not study the effects of shock on informal sector but they found that 
informal sector and formal sector are in general counter-cyclical in Cameroon. Contraction of 
the formal sector releases labor which finds refuge in the informal sector and also favors the 
consumption of less quality informal-based goods.  
 
This increase in the demand for informal-based goods stimulates the production and 
employment so that the incomes of informal actors remain less sensitive to the reducing 
pressure of the labor surplus released by the formal sector. They concluded that a sustainable 
growth strategy must be based on policies that could accelerate productivity in the informal 
sector, and thus improve the quality of work and quality of its products. 
 
This policy recommendation found a strong support from the analysis of Montaud (2000) 
based on two approaches of the informal sector in the context of Equator. The first approach 
treats the informal sector as subsistence activities and restricted operating in a kind of 
marginality, as failing to fit into the rest of the economy. The second approach considers a 
wide sector size perfectly inserted into the economy operating in a competitive logic with the 
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formal sector. Based on the first approach, an enhancement of informal firms’ capital stock 
improves its output and the incomes of its workers. The rise of incomes implies an increase in 
the consumption of formal and rural-based goods thus stimulates the production and 
employment in these sectors. Finally subsistence activities decline but the incomes and 
employment improve in all the economy. Within the same framework an improvement of 
labor productivity in the informal sector generates similar results with a greater magnitude. 
 
Follow-up this study, Alia, Ndjana, and Nghogue (2009) evaluate through a CGE model the 
impact of the rise of the informal households investment through the program “Integrated 
Support Program for Actors of the Informal Sector” in Cameroon and they found nuanced 
results. According to their findings, 26% increase in informal actors’ investment lead to a rise 
of the production and the demand for labor by 0.43% within the informal sector. The incomes 
also increase by 0.15% and thus stimulate the demand of informal-based goods by 0.1%. But 
this good performance in the informal sector is followed by a weak contraction of the formal 
sector due to an eviction effect. The reduction of output and incomes in the formal sector 
generates unfortunately a decrease in the Government receipts by 0.31%. In fact public 
receipts are mainly based on taxes on the formal sector activities. 
 
All these studies cited above whether theoretical or empirical shed light on the positive and 
paradoxical effects of policies promoting the informal economy. But their main limit is the 
lack of the labor quality aspects in their framework. However there are strong proofs that the 
skills determine the sector in which one can find job. Skilled people in general prefer 
employment in the formal sector which usually provides the highest incomes associated with 
social protection. But structural issues in Africa constraint the formal sector to provide jobs 
for all the qualified labor. So the “remaining” qualified labor is absorbed by the informal 
sector. However, the informal sector values education because the skilled salaried workers are 
relatively better paid than the unskilled one (Traoré, 2013). 
Considering labor quality issues could lead to nuanced results when implementing policies to 
promote the informal sector. For instance, there is strong evidence that the elasticity of 
substitution between unskilled labor and physical capital is higher than physical capital and 
skilled labor within the informal sector (Amaral and Quintin, 2006). In fact for informal firms 
faced with credit constraints but taking advantage on wages flexibility, unskilled labor may be 
a better substitute for physical capital than skilled labor. And thanks to the previous literature 
review, one knows how important the effects of policies beneficial to the informal economy 
are sensitive to the degree of substitutability between labor and capital. 
Zerbo (2006) included labor quality issues combined with social protection issues in his 
analysis of urban labor market in Sub-Saharan Africa, but he did not focus on policies 
supporting the informal sector. More recent studies also considered labor quality aspects in 
their general equilibrium model analysis but they focused on policy experiments related to 
minimum wage, wage subsidy for lower-skilled formal workers, unemployment benefits, tax 
policies and trade liberalization (Charlot et al, 2015; Bosch and Esteban-Pretel, 2015; Erero et 
al, 2014; Erero et al, 2013; Meghir et al, 2012; Davies et al, 2011).  
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So even if our study does not address the informal workers’ productivity, it incorporates a 
better realistic feature of the informal sector and the informal-formal linkage in Burkina 
Faso’s context. In fact our model considered an informal sector combining unskilled labor, 
skilled labor and capital through a two levels CES production technology like the other 
sectors. The elasticity of substitution between capital and the composite labor is assumed to 
be higher than 1 and the elasticity of substitution between the different types of labor less than 
one. Furthermore, competition and cooperation between the formal and informal sectors are 
taken into account depending on the branch activity. Finally, the “hidden” informal 
employment (employment deprived from social protection) in the formal sector is addressed 
in our analysis.  
3. The Model  
In this paper, the theoretical framework is an adaptation of the PEP standard single-country 
and static CGE model: PEP-1-1, (Version 2.1). This CGE model is based on the structure of 
the SAM-2008 developed by the IFPRI for Burkina Faso. The model
6
 can be summarized into 
four blocks of interdependent equations:  i) Supply; ii) Demand; iii) Income distribution; iv) 
Equilibrium and closure 
3.1. Supply 
The local production technology is represented by a nested function with several levels. At the 
top level, sectoral production (informal, formal and agricultural sectors) combines value 
added and total intermediate consumption in fixed shares following a Leontief input-output 
function. At the second level, each industry’s value added consists of composite labor and 
capital, following a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) specification. Finally, at the 
bottom level on the value added side, the various categories of labor are imperfect substitutes 
in aggregate labor according to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology.  
3.2 Demand    
Based on the Armington assumption, composite products demanded on the domestic market 
are a combination of local and imported products according to a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES). Output demand for intermediate consumption for each good is a fixed 
proportion of the aggregate input consumption by economic sectors. Demand of each goods 
and service for investment purposes is a fixed value share of total investment. Inventory 
changes are assumed to be exogenous. 
3.3 Income distribution 
Household incomes come from labor earnings, capital earnings and transfers received from 
other agents included the Government. Each household category receives a fixed share of the 
earnings of each type of labor. Likewise, total capital income is distributed between agents, 
including households, in fixed shares. Government’s incomes include tax receipts on 
                                                          
6
 The details of the model are provided in Appendix  
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households’ incomes, tax revenues on economic activities, capital remuneration, and official 
development assistance (bilateral and multilateral aid) from abroad. 
3.4 Equilibrium and closure 
Following the neoclassic perfect competitive market, equilibrium between the supply and 
demand of each commodity on the domestic market must be verified. Also, the total demand 
for each factor (labor and capital) must equal available supply (exogenous). Likewise, total 
investment expenditure must be equal to the sum of agents’ savings.  
The closure of the model is based on the neoclassic rule. That means total investment is 
endogenous and driven by total savings which is a function of the full employment of 
resources income. Income distribution is then determined only from the supply side. Once the 
full-employment income is determined, consumption is derived then saving and finally 
investment. The exchange rate is defined as the numeraire, with government expenditures and 
the current account balance fixed. Capital is mobile between industries.  
4. Data and calibration 
4.1 Data 
The SAM-2008
7
 for Burkina Faso represents economic interactions through six (06) groups of 
accounts: i) 28 accounts production activities; ii) 28 accounts for commodities (each activity 
produces a single good or service and each commodity is produced by a single activity); iii) 7 
factors of production (6 types of labor and a single class of capital); iv) 8 categories of 
households depending on the activity of the household head (3 salaried, 3 agricultural and 2 
non-agricultural); v) 2 other institutional agents: the Government and the Rest of the World; 
vi) 1 savings-investment account. 
Based on the objectives of our study, the 28 branches of production were grouped into five 
branches: Agriculture; Formal industry; Informal industry; Formal service; Informal service. 
The agriculture industry includes the agro-forestry-pastoral production. The distinction 
between informal and formal firms is based on the National Office of Statistics (in Burkina 
Faso) operational definition of the informal sector
8
. Based on the SAM-2008, we illustrate 
through the following graphs, the share of informal activities in the total value added, in the 
total demand for capital, as well as the total employment and their linkage with the formal 
sector. 
According to Graph 1 below, in 2008, the economy of Burkina Faso was driven by highly 
productive formal services (as modern trade; modern transport; post and telecommunications 
and financial services) followed by the agricultural sector. The formal industries were 
embryonic whereas the contribution of the informal sector (industries and services) was about 
19.05% of the value added which is not negligible.  
                                                          
7
 A detailed description of the SAM is provided in Appendix 
8 According to the National Office of Statistics in Burkina Faso, the informal sector refers to all the units of 
production without a fiscal identification number and/or which do not keep written books 
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Graph 1: Repartition of the total value added per sector 
 
Source: SAM-2008 for Burkina Faso 
Concerning the demand for capital, the formal sector used about 64.43% of the total 
productive capital followed by the agriculture sector (24.08%) whereas the informal sector 
had access to only 11.49% (Graph 2). So the informal sector seems to be constrained by the 
capital side. 
Graph 2: Repartition of the aggregate demand for capital per sector 
 
Source: SAM-2008 for Burkina Faso 
According to Graph 3 (below), 37.48% of the total labor income was provided by the 
agricultural sector whereas the formal services account for 33.30%. The informal sector 
contributed substantively to 23.91% of the total labor incomes. 
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Graph 3: Repartition of the aggregate labor income per sector 
 
Source: SAM-2008 for Burkina Faso 
Concerning the linkage between the formal and informal sectors, about 49.06% of the total 
intermediate consumption of the informal industries was provided by the formal sector 
(formal industry and service). Likewise, the informal services acquired about 70.86% of its 
total intermediate consumption from the formal sector. So the production in the informal 
sector is strongly dependant on the formal sector output. However, the informal industries 
represented only 2.44% of the total intermediate consumption of the formal industries where 
as informal services provided up to 16.53%. About 22.91% of the formal services total 
intermediate consumption stemmed from the informal sector. So, the production in the formal 
sector is relatively less relying on the informal sector output.   
4.2 The Calibration 
The calibration is about the determination of numerical values of the parameters and 
coefficients so as to reconstitute the equilibrium situation of the SAM. Some of the 
parameters as elasticities of substitution are fixed according to the literature and others are 
computed based on the values provided by the SAM. Based on the literature of CGE model 
applied for Burkina Faso economy (Sawadogo et al, 2015; Balma et al, 2010) we summarized 
the values of some parameters in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Initial values of some parameters 
Elasticities 
Elasticity of 
substitution 
between 
capital and 
composite 
labor in sector 
j 
Elasticity of 
substitution 
between 
types of labor 
in sector j 
Elasticity of 
transformation 
between exports 
and local sales 
Elasticity of 
substitution 
between local 
supply and 
imports 
Household 
Income 
elasticity  
Frisch 
parameter 
1.5 0.8 2 2 1.05 -1.5 
37.48% 
5.31% 
33.30% 
14.05% 
9.86% 
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
30% 
35% 
40% 
Agriculture Formal industry Formal service Informal industry Informal service 
Share in the total labor incomes 
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Prices 
Price of the 
local 
commodity i 
Price of 
exported 
commodity i 
World price of 
imported 
product i 
Wage rate of 
type l labor 
Rental rate 
of capital 
in sector j 
Price 
elasticity 
of indexed 
1 1 1 1         1        1 
i,j: formal industry; formal services; informal industry; informal services; agriculture 
l:rural formal; formal unskilled; formal skilled; rural informal; informal unskilled; formal skilled 
 
5. Policy experiments  
Since the 1990s, Burkina Faso has been implementing a number of specific programs to 
promote employment creation through the financing and vocational trainings for 
microenterprises. Among the major employment programs are the Informal Sector Support 
Fund (FASI), the Employment Creation Support Fund (FAPE), the Youth Initiatives Support 
Fund (FAIJ) and the Vocational Training and Learning Support Fund (FAFPA).  
Created in 1998, the primarily objective of FASI is to improve access to credit for the 
informal sector. The Fund provides credit (up to 1.5 million FCFA) with interest rate between 
8% to 13% depending on the projects size and its area of activities. The interest rates and 
guaranties requirement are lower than the requirements of the microfinance institutions and 
the commercial banks. Practically, the program is assigned to grant 700 million FCFA credit 
per year to finance 1500 microenterprises. But in fact, this target is not always reached. For 
instance, in 2010, the most recent data
9
, the Fund provided loans in the amount of 532 501 
000 FCFA to 1244 enterprises which generated 256 new jobs and consolidated 2922 jobs. 
  
The FAIJ (created in 2007) objective is to reduce poverty, unemployment and 
underemployment of youth in urban and rural areas. It lends loans up to 2 million FCFA with 
interest rate between 2% to 4% followed by entrepreneurship trainings. Specifically, the 
program is aimed to reach 5000 Young per year. In 2010, the Fund financed 1297 projects for 
an amount of 1 273 964 000 FCFA which created about 5904 new jobs for Young.  
So FASI and FAIJ granted 1 806 465 000 FCFA to the informal actors in 2010. However this 
amount represents only 1% of the value of the demand for capital in the informal sector 
according to the SAM-2008. Aware of this insignificance, the Government announced in 
2014 the opening of a special fund to grant up to 10 billion FCFA credit for the informal firms 
and women entrepreneurship. Based on the latter facts, we simulate a rise of 10% of the 
demand for capital in the informal sector which is equivalent to about 14.5 billion FCFA 
according to the SAM-2008. The process to get the fund or credit is not analyzed. The interest 
is focused on the final objective of the micro-lending program which is the increase in the 
demand for capital (investment) in the informal sector. In the same line, our second policy 
experiment is a 10% increase in the Government’s transfers to the informal households (the 
own account workers and the informal sector salaried workers).  
                                                          
9
 Observatoire National de L’Emploi et de la Formation Professionnelle (2011). Annuaire statistique du marché 
de l’emploi-2010. Document d’analyse, Ministère de la Jeunesse de la Formation Professionnelle et de l’Emploi, 
Burkina Faso  
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6. Results 
6.1. Simulation 1: 10% increase in the demand for capital in the informal sector  
Impact on employment, incomes and production within the informal sector 
A 10% increase in the demand for capital by the informal sector induces an increase in the 
demand for all the various types of labor. However, the increase in the formal and qualified 
labor demand is higher than that of the informal and unskilled labor (see Table 1 below). For 
instance, the demand for rural formal labor, for urban formal skilled labor, and for the urban 
informal skilled labor expand more than 1% whereas the ones for rural informal and urban 
informal unskilled labor raise only by 0.65% and 0.82%. Furthermore, the overall 
enhancement of the demand for composite labor tends to reduce the wages following the 
flexibility of wages in the informal sector (and in the model). All the wages of the different 
category of labor decrease by at least 0.14% except the wage of the rural informal labor and 
the urban informal unskilled which get the lowest increases in demand. 
Table 2: Impact on employment and wages in the informal sector 
Demand for categories of labor Change (%) Wages of categories of labor Change (%) 
Rural formal labor 1.06 Rural formal labor -0.14 
Urban formal unskilled 1.11 Urban formal unskilled -0.17 
Urban formal skilled 1.11 Urban formal skilled -0.17 
Rural informal 0.65 Rural informal 0.12 
Urban informal unskilled 0.82 Urban informal unskilled 0.007 
Urban informal skilled 1.08 Urban informal skilled -0.15 
 
It is worth to highlight that the composite informal labor (rural, unskilled and skilled) 
accounts for about 91% of the total labor used by the informal industry and about 98% of that 
of the informal services sector. So the informal labor is most confined in the informal sector. 
Moreover about 88% of the total labor incomes of the farmers come from their supply of 
informal employment mostly from the rural informal labor (72.8%). Likewise about 58% of 
the total labor incomes of the own account workers comes from their supply of informal 
employment mostly from the rural informal labor (50.34%). 
So the combined improvement of the demand for rural informal labor and its associated wage 
lead to an upward pressure on the farmers’ labor incomes which increase marginally by 
0.063%. But the own account workers’ total labor incomes decrease by 0.068%. However, 
following the new inflow of capital in the informal sector, the households’ capital incomes 
rise despite the lowering of the rental rate and offset the fall of labor incomes for the own 
account workers. Finally the aggregate income enhances for the farmers and the own account 
workers by 0.146% and 0.144%.  
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Table 3: Impact on the incomes in the informal sector 
Households Labor incomes 
Change (%) 
Capital incomes 
Change (%) 
Total Income 
Change (%) 
The Farmers 0.063 0.286 0.146 
The own account 
workers 
-0.068 0.286 0.144 
 
These two categories of households are the largest consumers of the informal sector output. 
According to the SAM-2008, about 65% of the informal sector output is consumed by the 
farmers whereas the own account workers consume about 12.37%. But when their incomes 
improve these households reduce their demand for the informal goods and services in favor of 
the formal sector products. Indeed, the demand for the informal sector output declines by 
0.91% for the farmers and by 0.97% for the own account workers. Despite the rise of its price, 
the demand for the formal goods and services increases by 0.25% for the farmers and by 0.2% 
for the own account workers. These results are in line with the findings of Bohme and Thiele 
(2011) in the case of six West African capitals.  
Moreover, due to the increase in its price, the demand of informal sector’s output for 
intermediate goods and for investment purposes drop by 0.41% and 1.82% respectively. Thus 
the supply of the informal goods and services follow the decline of their domestic demand 
according to the equilibrium constraint. The aggregate productions of the informal industry 
and the informal services fall down respectively by 0.53% and 0.22% implying also a 
decrease in the total intermediate consumption and the value added of the informal sector. In 
fact, the value added of the informal sector declines by 0.75%. So an increase in the informal 
sector’s stock of capital results in a paradoxical contraction of its total production and its 
value added.  
Impact on employment, incomes and production within the formal sector 
As it is illustrated in the Section 4 the largest share of the total intermediate consumption of 
the informal sector is provided by the formal sector. So a reduction of the informal sector 
output leads to a decrease in its demand for the formal sector output as intermediate goods by 
1.5%. Even if the agricultural sector’s demand for the formal sector output as intermediate 
goods rises by 0.3% the overall demand for the formal sector output as intermediate goods 
falls down by 0.32%. Likewise, the total demand of the formal sector’s production for 
investment purposes declines by 0.078%. So the domestic demand for the formal sector 
output reduces by 0.16% even if the aggregate household consumption demand for formal 
goods and services increases by 0.106%. According to the equilibrium constraint the supply 
of the formal sector output also declines by 0.16%. 
Obviously the reduction of the supply generates a downward pressure on the value added and 
the aggregate intermediate consumption which decline proportionally by 0.16%. Following 
the cut of the formal sector value added, the demand for all types of labor also decreases 
along with the associated wages whereas the demand for capital remained unchanged. The 
demands for rural informal labor and for urban informal unskilled fall down by 0.53% and 
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0.35% respectively. Nevertheless the lessening is weaker for the demands for formal and 
qualified labor (see Table 4 below).  
Table 4: Impact on employment in the formal sector 
Labor 
types 
Rural 
formal 
labor 
Urban 
formal 
unskilled 
Urban 
formal 
skilled 
Rural 
informal 
Urban 
informal 
unskilled 
Urban 
informal 
skilled 
Change 
(%) 
-0.12 -0.074 -0.071 -0.53 -0.35 -0.09 
 
The formal labor (rural, skilled and unskilled) represents 81.83% of the aggregate labor 
demand used by the formal industry and 66.08% of the one of the formal services. So the 
formal employment is most confined in the formal sector. Furthermore, about 75% of the 
public salaried households’ incomes labor stem from the supply of the formal labor (rural, 
skilled and unskilled). Likewise about 77% of the formal private salaried households’ 
incomes labor stem from the formal labor (rural, skilled and unskilled). About 50% of the 
informal private salaried households’ labor incomes come from the formal labor (rural, skilled 
and unskilled).  
So the reduction of the labor demand and the wages in the formal sector affects more severely 
the former categories of households. Indeed, the public salaried households’ incomes labor 
decreases by 0.15% and the formal private salaried households’ incomes labor falls down by 
0.14% (see Table 5).  
But the injection of new capital through the informal sector tends to increase the capital 
incomes of all the households. This rising of capital incomes offsets the decline of the labor 
incomes but finally the total income of the public salaried households, the formal private 
salaried households and the informal private salaried households shrink weakly by 0.02%, 
0.081% and 0.08%. 
Following the decrease of their incomes, these households reduce their consumption of goods 
and services. The formal-based goods and services represent about 64% of the total 
consumption of the public salaried households and 67% of the one of the formal private 
salaried households. Their consumption of both formal and informal products decreases 
which tend to reinforce the reduction of the supplies of the concerned sectors.  
Table 5: Impact on incomes in the formal sector 
Households Labor incomes 
Change (%) 
Capital incomes 
Change (%) 
Total Income   
Change (%) 
The public salaried 
households 
-0.15 0.286 -0.02 
 
The formal private salaried 
households 
-0.145 0.286 -0.08 
 
The informal private 
salaried households 
-0.135 0.286 -0.081 
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Impact on employment, incomes and production within the agricultural sector  
The farmers are the largest consumers of agricultural products. They consume about 83.65% 
of the total consumption of agricultural products. The own account workers consume only 
5.6% of the total consumption of agricultural products more than the salaried public 
households who consume 4.41%. With their rising incomes combined with the decrease in the 
agricultural output price, the farmers and the own account workers tend to increase their 
demand for agricultural products. So the total demand by households for agricultural products 
enhance by 0.21% even if some households as the formal private salaried households reduce 
their demand due to the decrease of their incomes.  
Due to the contraction of the formal and informal sectors the overall demand of agricultural 
output as intermediate goods falls down by 0.19% but the aggregate domestic demand of the 
agricultural goods still increases by 0.15%. This increase implies also a proportional increase 
in the supply and the value added of the agricultural sector by 0.15%. With the increase of the 
value added, the demand for capital remains constant whereas the demand for labor offered a 
mixed picture (see Table 6).  
Indeed, the demand for rural formal labor falls down by 0.012% whereas the demands for 
urban formal unskilled labor and urban formal skilled rise by 0.012% and 0.013% 
respectively. The rural informal labor which represents 65.4% of the total labor demand in the 
agricultural sector registers the biggest decrease in its demand around 0.21%. The demand for 
urban informal unskilled labor accounting for about 18.92% of the total labor demand in the 
agricultural sector also declines by 0.13%.  
In fact the rural informal labor and the urban informal unskilled labor are most confined in the 
agricultural and informal sectors. While the demand of these two types of labor decline in the 
agricultural sector, their demands increase in the informal sector. Knowing that the demand 
for all types of labor shrinks in the formal sector, one can assume that the rural informal labor 
and the urban informal unskilled labor move from the agricultural sector to the informal 
sector. 
Table 6: Impact on employment in the agricultural sector 
Labor 
types 
Rural 
formal 
labor 
Urban 
formal 
unskilled 
Urban 
formal 
skilled 
Rural 
informal 
Urban 
informal 
unskilled 
Urban 
informal 
skilled 
Change 
(%) 
-0.012 0.012 0.013 -0.21 -0.13 0.0003 
 
The farmers account for 99.69% of the total rural informal labor and 50.03% of the total 
urban informal unskilled labor. So the weak decrease in the demand of these categories of 
labor in the agricultural sector may imply a contraction of the labor incomes of the farmers. 
But as it was shown above the farmers’ earnings also come from the informal sector where 
the demand for labor and the wages are improving. Finally the total income of the farmers 
increases. 
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As a summary at the sectoral level, the informal and formal sectors contract whereas the 
agricultural sector expands. Employment tends to move from the formal sector to the informal 
sector mainly. These findings are in line with the conclusion of Arvin-Rad et al (2010) which 
argues that a credit subsidy to the informal sector leads to a decrease in the output of the 
informal sector and the domestic urban sector while the rural sector expands if and only the 
elasticity of substitution between the labor and capital is greater than unity in the informal 
sector.  
Impact on tax revenues and the GDP 
According to the SAM, the formal industry and the formal services mobilized respectively 
83.3% and 7.35% of the total taxes on products. The informal industry and the informal 
services represent only 7.25% and 1.28% of the total taxes on products. The contribution of 
the agricultural sector is almost insignificant, only 0.83%. Concerning the taxes and duties on 
imports, the formal sector (industry and services) accounts for about 94% whereas the 
agricultural sector mobilized only 6%. In our model the informal firms do not import goods 
and services due their lack of compliance with the legal and administrative rules.    
With the contraction of the formal sector, the contributions of the formal industry and the 
formal services to the total taxes on products decrease by 0.031% and 0.058% respectively. 
Despite the reduction of the informal sector output, the shares of the informal industry and the 
informal services to the total taxes on products increase by 0.3% and 0.7%. The agricultural 
sector’s share declines by 0.015%. Finally, the total Government revenues from taxes on 
products remains almost unchanged (a rise by 0.00015%). The total Government’s revenues 
from taxes and duties on imports decrease marginally by 0.0025%. According to the 
variations of their imports, the share of the total taxes and duties on imports mobilized by the 
formal industry rises slightly by 0.0085% whereas the shares of the formal services and the 
agricultural sector declines by 0.01% and 0.175% respectively. 
Besides, the salaried households (public, formal and informal private sectors) provide about 
83.7% of the total Government’s revenue from household income taxes. The contribution of 
the farmers accounts for about 11.67% whereas the one of the own account workers is only 
around 1.1%. After the policy shock on the informal sector, the contributions of the salaried 
households decrease according to the decline of their incomes. At the opposite, the 
contributions of the farmers and the own account workers increase by 0.146% and 0.144% 
respectively. But as the former categories of households are not the largest providers, the total 
Government’s revenue from household income taxes shrink by 0.037%. Even if the overall 
Government’s revenue from taxes decreases its revenues from capital and external transfers 
tend to increase its overall receipts and reduce its deficit (Table 7). 
Table 7: Impact on Government’s incomes 
Taxes revenues Change (%) Government incomes Change (%) 
Total taxes on products  0.00015 Government capital income 0.286 
Total taxes and duties on imports 0.0025 Government transfer income 0.081 
Total income taxes -0.037 Total Government income 0.024 
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Following the contraction of the formal and informal sectors, the real GDP at basic prices 
decreases by 0.048% but the real GDP at market price rises weakly by 0.015%.  
6.2. Simulation 2: 10% increase in the public transfers to the informal households  
The informal households encompass the own account workers and the informal private 
salaried households. The increase in the public transfers tends to enhance the total incomes of 
the own account workers and the informal private salaried households by 0.15% and 0.12% 
respectively. The increase in total incomes implies the rise of their total consumption of goods 
and services and their savings. But this enhancement is not sufficient enough to pull up the 
aggregate demand for goods and services especially as the consumption of other households is 
declining. In fact the informal households account for about 15.91% of the aggregate demand 
for goods and services. 
Beyond the improvement of incomes for only the informal households, the increase in the 
public transfers causes an eviction effect on the public investment spending while degrading 
the Government’s budget deficit. Indeed the final demand of formal goods, informal goods 
and informal services for public investment purposes decreases by 0.025%; 0.05% and 
0.052% respectively. Only the demand of formal services for public investment purposes 
enhances by 0.053%. So the decrease of the public investment spending tends to pull down 
the domestic demand and the supply of the formal industry and the informal sector (industry 
and services). This results in the drop in their intermediate consumptions, their final demand 
for private investment purposes which affect negatively on domestic demands, productions 
and valued added of the agricultural sector and the formal services sector (Table 8). 
The decreasing value added of all the sectors remains the distribution of the capital 
unchanged. But the demand of types of labor rises in all the sectors except in the formal 
services sector. That results in the decrease in wages and labor incomes for all categories of 
households (Table 9). The public transfers offsets the drop of labor incomes for the informal 
households only whereas the total incomes of the formal households shrinks then pulling 
down the aggregate consumption of goods and services as well as the domestic demand 
(Table 10). 
The households’ incomes taxes follow the variation of their total incomes but at the end the 
total Government’s revenue from household income taxes remains constant. Moreover with 
the contraction of all the sectors the total government revenue from taxes on products and 
imports declines by 0.023%. Finally the real GDP at basic prices decreases by 0.09% along 
with the real GDP at market price by 0.088%. 
Table 8: Impact on value added per sector 
Value 
added 
Agriculture 
Formal 
Industry 
Informal 
Industry 
Formal 
Services 
Informal 
Services 
Change 
(%) 
-0.17 -0.13 -0.08 -0.009 -0.101 
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Table 9: Impact on employment and wages in all the sectors 
Labor demand 
Change (%) 
Agriculture Formal 
Industries 
Informal 
Industries 
Formal 
Services 
Informal 
Services  
Wages 
Change 
(%) 
Rural formal 
labor 
0.02 0.054 0.057 -0.018 0.05 -0.065 
 
Urban formal 
unskilled 
0.02 0.0547 0.057 -0.017 0.05 -0.066 
Urban formal 
skilled 
0.025 0.059 0.062 -0.013 0.055 -0.072 
 
Rural informal -0.015 0.019 0.022 -0.053 0.015 -0.022 
 
Urban informal 
unskilled 
0.0028 0.037 0.04 -0.03 0.033 -0.044 
 
Urban informal 
skilled 
0.024 0.058 0.061 -0.013 0.054 -0.071 
 
 
Table 10: Impact on households incomes  
Households Labor incomes 
Change (%) 
Capital incomes 
Change (%) 
Total Income 
Change (%) 
The public salaried 
households 
-0.068 
 
-0.052 
 
-0.0586 
 
The formal private salaried 
households 
-0.067 
 
-0.052 
 
-0.0589 
 
The informal private 
salaried households 
-0.065 
 
-0.052 
 
0.12 
 
The Farmers -0.031 
 
-0.052 
 
-0.0362 
 
The own account workers -0.055 
 
-0.052 
 
0.15 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
This study, based on the PEP standard single-country and static CGE model adapted to the 
structure of the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM-2008) developed by the IFPRI for Burkina 
Faso, shed light on the direct and indirect effects of public policies improving access to 
capital and liquidity for the informal economy. The first policy scenario deals with a 10% 
increase in the demand for capital in the informal sector while the second one is the same 
increase in the public transfers toward the informal households. 
The paper provides evidence that the first policy shock leads to a paradoxical and negative 
effect on the informal sector’s output which decreases. The indirect effects are materialized 
by the decline in the formal sector’s output whereas the one of the agricultural sector expands. 
The contraction of the formal sector causes a release of all categories of labor which find 
refuge mostly in the informal sector where the aggregate demand for labor increases. The total 
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incomes of the farmers and the own account workers, mostly confined in the informal and 
agricultural sectors, improve. However the public salaried households, the formal private 
salaried households and the informal private salaried households, mostly confined in the 
formal sector, witness their total incomes falling down.  
With their improving incomes the farmers and the own account workers, the largest 
consumers of the informal sector’s output, increase their consumption of formal-based goods 
and services at the expense of the informal-based ones. This change of preference is mainly 
the origin of the informal sector’s contraction.  The contraction of the formal sector is 
imputable to the decrease in the informal sector’s demand for the formal sector’s output as 
intermediate consumption. This contraction is reinforced by the decline of the consumption of 
the public and private salaried workers, the largest consumers of formal-based goods and 
services. Following the decline of the formal sector and some household incomes, the total 
Government revenues from taxes on products remains almost unchanged whereas its total 
revenue from household income taxes shrinks. Finally, the real GDP at basic prices drops by 
0.048% but the real GDP at market price rises weakly by 0.015%. 
The second policy experiment benefited only the own account workers and the informal 
private salaried households whom total incomes enhance marginally. But as the public 
transfers are funded by the Government it causes an eviction effect on the public investment 
spending which pulls down the domestic demand and the supply of the formal industry and 
the informal sector (industry and services). It results negative spillovers in terms of a decrease 
in outputs in all the sectors and a degradation of incomes for the public salaried households, 
the formal private salaried households and the farmers. Following the contraction of the 
sectoral productions and the incomes, the total Government revenue from taxes also 
decreases. Finally, the real GDP at basic prices falls down by 0.09% along with the real GDP 
at market price by 0.088%. 
Enlightened by these findings, we advise the policymakers to go beyond credit and cash 
incentives for the informal economy if the objective is to propel the economic growth in 
Burkina Faso. Relaxing liquidity constraints faced by the informal economy would surely 
improve marginally the incomes of some households (farmers and own account workers). But 
it will not generate significant and positive spillovers for the entire economy. So intuitively, 
the Government may jointly implement policies focusing on highly productive sectors as the 
formal industry and services able to boost growth, tax revenue mobilization and reduce the 
budget deficit. 
Beyond the limitations of our model such as the flexibility of wages in the formal sector, the 
lack of unemployment, the old reference year of the SAM as well as the sensitivity to the 
initial values of the elasticities, this study did not address the effects of enhancing the 
productivity of the informal sector workers through vocational trainings for example. 
Knowing the productivity gap between the formal and informal sectors, future research may 
investigate whether enhancing the informal sector’s productivity would generate positive 
spillovers on growth, incomes and employment. 
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Appendix 
The CGE model 
All sectors: i; All commodities: j, ij; Labor categories: l; All agents: ag, agj; Households 
categories: h, hj; Non government agent: agng; domestic agents: agd 
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Volume variables 
hiC , : Consumption of commodity i by type h households  
MIN
hiC ,  : Minimum consumption of commodity i by type h households  
iCG  : Public consumption of commodity i  
jCI  : Total intermediate consumption of industry j  
REAL
hCTH  : Real consumption expenditures of household h  
iDD  : Domestic demand for commodity i produced locally  
jiDI ,  : Intermediate consumption of commodity i by industry j  
iDIT  : Total intermediate demand for commodity i  
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ijDS ,  : Supply of commodity i by sector j to the domestic market  
ijEX ,  : Quantity of product i exported by sector j  
iEXD  : World demand for exports of product i  
REALG  : Real government expenditures  
REALBPGDP   : Real GDP at basic prices  
REALMPGDP   : Real GDP at market prices  
REALGFCF  : Real gross fixed capital formation  
iIM  : Quantity of product i imported  
iINV  : Final demand of commodity i for investment purposes  
iINVP  : Final demand of commodity i for private investment purposes 
iINVG  : Final demand of commodity i for public investment purposes 
jKD  : Demand for capital by industry j  
KS  : Supply of capital  
jlLD ,  : Demand for type l labor by industry j  
jLDC  : Industry j demand for composite labor  
)(lLS  : Supply of type l labor  
iQ : Quantity demanded of composite commodity i  
jVA : Value added of industry j  
iVSTK  : Inventory change of commodity i  
ijXS ,  : Industry j production of commodity i  
Price Variables  
e  : Exchange rate; price of foreign currency in terms of local currency  
ijP ,  : Basic price of industry j’s production of commodity i  
iPC  : Purchaser price of composite commodity i (including all taxes and margins)  
jPCI  : Intermediate consumption price index of industry j  
iPD  : Price of local product i sold on the domestic market (including all taxes and margins)  
iPE  : Price received for exported commodity i (excluding export taxes)  
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FOB
iPE  : FOB price of exported commodity i (in local currency)  
PIXCON  : Consumer price index  
PIXGDP  : GDP deflator  
PIXGVT  : Public expenditures price index  
PIXIVN  : Investment price index  
iPL  : Price of local product i (excluding all taxes on products)  
iPM  : Price of imported product i (including all taxes and tariffs)  
iPP  : Industry j unit cost 
jPT  : Basic price of industry j’s output  
iPVA  : Price of industry j value added 
iPWM  : World price of imported product i (expressed in foreign currency)  
iPWX  : World price of exported product i (expressed in foreign currency)  
jR  : Rental rate of capital in industry j  
lW  : Wage rate of type l labor  
jWC  : Wage rate of industry j composite labor  
Nominal (Value) Variables  
CAB  : Current account balance  
hCTH  : Consumption budget of type h households  
G  : Current government expenditures on goods and services  
BPGDP  : GDP at basic prices  
MPGDP  : GDP at market prices  
 GFCF  : Gross fixed capital formation  
IT  : Total investment expenditures  
SG  : Government savings  
hSH  : Savings of type h households  
SROW  : Rest-of-the-world savings  
hTDH  : Income taxes of type h households  
TDHT  : Total government revenue from household income taxes  
iTIC  : Government revenue from indirect taxes on product i  
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TICT  : Total government receipts of indirect taxes on commodities  
iTIM  : Government revenue from import duties on product i  
TIMT  : Total government revenue from import duties  
agjagTR ,  : Transfers from agent agj to agent ag  
hYDH  : Disposable income of type h households  
YG  : Total government income  
YGK  : Government capital income  
YGTR  : Government transfer income  
hYH  : Total income of type h households  
hYHK  : Capital income of type h households  
hYHL  : Labor income of type h households  
hYHTR  : Transfer income of type h households  
YGTR : Rest of the World income 
Parameters 
hs  : Slope (type h household savings)  
httdh  : Marginal income tax rate of type h households  
ittic  : Tax rate on commodity i  
ittim  : Rate of taxes and duties on imports of commodity i  
jiaij ,  : Input-output coefficient  
j
LDB  : Scale parameter (CES – composite labor)  
i
MB  : Scale parameter (CES – composite commodity)  
j
VAB  Scale parameter (CES – value added)  
ij
XB , : Scale parameter (CET – exports and local sales)  
jl
LD
, : Share parameter (CES – composite labor)  
i
M  : Share parameter (CES – composite commodity)  
i
VA  : Share parameter (CES – value added)  
ij
x
,  : Share parameter (CET – exports and local sales)  
  : Price elasticity of indexed transfers and parameters  
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GVT
i : Share of commodity i in total current public expenditures on goods and services  
INV
i  : Share of commodity i in total investment expenditures  
INVP
i  : Share of commodity i in total private investment expenditures 
GVT
i  : Share of commodity i in total public investment expenditures 
LES
hi, : Marginal share of commodity i in type h household consumption budget  
jio : Coefficient (Leontief – intermediate consumption)  
RK
ag : Share of capital income received by agent ag  
agjag
TR
, : Share parameter (transfer functions)  
hl
WL
, : Share of type l labor income received by type h households  
LD
j  : Elasticity parameter (CES – composite labor);  
M
i : Elasticity parameter (CES – composite commodity);  
VA
j : Elasticity parameter (CES – value added);  
X
ij , : Elasticity parameter (CET – exports and local sales);  
LD
j : Elasticity of substitution (CES – composite labor);  
M
i : Elasticity of substitution (CES – composite commodity);  
VA
j : Elasticity of transformation (CES – value added);  
X
ij , : Elasticity of transformation (CET – exports and local sales);  
hi
Y
,  : Income elasticity (LES- households’ consumption) 
j : Coefficient (Leontief – value added)  
            Exogenous variables  
MIN
hiC ,  : Minimum consumption of commodity i by type h households  
CAB  : Current account balance  
e  : Exchange rate; price of foreign currency in terms of local currency  
G  : Current government expenditures on goods and services  
gvthTR ,  : Transfers from Government to household h  
jKD : Demand for capital by industry j  
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KS  : Supply of capital 
)(lLS : Supply of type l labor  
iPWM  : World price of imported product i (expressed in foreign currency)  
iPWX  : World price of exported product i (expressed in foreign currency)  
hs  : Slope (type h household savings)  
httdh  : Marginal income tax rate of type h households  
ittic  : Tax rate on commodity i  
ittim  : Rate of taxes and duties on imports of commodity i  
iVSTK : Inventory change of commodity i 
Description of SAM/2008 for Burkina Faso  
Groups of Accounts  
 
                                  Description 
 
Activities/Commodities 
Agriculture (9)  
 
Cereals; Fruits and vegetables; Cotton; Other cash crops; Cattle; 
Other farms; Livestock products; Forest; and Fish 
Formal Industries (6) 
 
Extractive industry (Mining); Modern drink and tobacco; Textiles; 
Electricity; Gas and water; Other modern manufacturing; Modern 
construction 
Informal Industries (2) 
 
Informal manufacturing industries; Informal building firms 
Formal Services (8) 
 
Modern trade; Modern transport; Post and Telecommunications; 
Financial services; Hotel; Other modern commercial services; Non-
commercial private and parastatal services; and non-commercial 
public services 
Informal Services (3) 
 
Informal trade; Informal transport; Other informal market services 
Factors of production (Inputs) 
Labor (6) 
 
Rural formal; Urban formal skilled; Urban formal unskilled; Rural 
informal; Urban informal skilled; and Urban informal unskilled 
Capital (1)  
 
Capital  
Institutions 
Households (8)  
 
Public sector salaried; Formal private sector salaried; Informal 
sector salaried; Own account workers or Non-agricultural 
employers; Farmers; and Inactive 
Others (2)  
 
Government and Rest of the World  
 
 
